I read a great article in the New York Times by way of Deadspin today on how today's NFL coaches are much too conservative on fourth down. The Times have even programmed a "bot" that will calculate when to go for it vs. when to punt or kick a Field Goal. If you haven't read the article, go check it out - I'll wait. This isn't necessarily groundbreaking stuff; there was a paper published early in the 2000s suggesting similar data, and folks like Bill Barnwell and some of the other advanced stat guys have been touting this for a long time. "Riverboat" Ron Rivera is making a lot of headlines this year, but when you look at the Times article, he's really just playing his percentages the right way - and while that's something gamblers do quite often and quite effectively, it seems to be unusual among other NFL head coaches (with one notable exception - and I'll get to that in a minute). In reading through the article, I agree with it, at least in principle. Generally speaking I believe most coaches (ours included) are much too conservative. The natural question is why. This topic has also been debated at some length, but I think it stems from two different areas. First and foremost, there's simply not a lot of innovation in today's NFL game. Changes to the game are often poo-pood (think the Read Option, which really, when you think about it is just another name for the Wildcat) or derided. There's just this belief that change can't work on an NFL level. Coaches are hesitant to embrace anything outside of the blueprint for what's worked before. Secondarily, I think that many coaches are feeling the pressure of winning on a drive-to-drive and game-to-game basis. And when a coach makes the wrong call it is often blown up. In today's media that means it goes out instantly via Twitter, over the airwaves on national broadcasts, and all of that before he gets a chance to explain himself during the end-of-game press conference. By the time they get there, the die has been caste and public opinion won't be swayed. There's one notable exception to this rule - Bill Belichik. For some reason, when Belichik goes for it inside his own team's 40 yard line, it's lauded as "going against the odds" and other knob-polishing garbage. (I'm looking at YOU, Phil Sims) Other coaches make the same call and they're just eviscerated by the commentary team (once again, I'm looking at YOU, Phil Sims) The only thing I can figure is that Belichick is the only guy coaching who has three Super Bowl rings, so he gets a pass, even though it's been 7 years since he won the last one. All the other coaches (except for Rivera, which the media has sort of gotten behind), are usually questioned. It's too bad too, because I think, for the most part, the New York Times is right and today's coaches are wrong. That said statistics taken within a vacuum are a dangerous thing. The NYT Bot recommends going for it inside the 10 if its 4th and 1, showing that it's the best bet. However, one has to wonder what happens to those odds if more teams start going for it on that down and distance - after all, I consider myself pretty studious when it comes to watching football and I don't really recall a lot of coaches going for it on 4th and 1 inside the 10. The ones that did were most likely down big and desperate to get back into the game. Something tells me that some of this data, especially on the "go for it" vs. "punt" data inside your own territory, may be somewhat skewed and should be taken with a huge pinch of salt. That disclaimer aside (and it's a big one), I do think that there's a happy medium that can be reached. Much like the old Draft Value Chart, I think it's time for a new chart to be made - one that a coach could easily reference to make a logical decision. So I built a chart. Mostly because I was bored, and I wanted to take my own crack at coming up with how I would handle the pressures of managing 4th down in the NFL. Here are the rules I established for myself: I would never go for it (even on 4th and 1) if I was inside the opponent's Field Goal range. For the purposes of this exercise, I set that range at 53 yards, meaning that I'm punting on 4th and 1 from the 37, but I'm going for it on 4th and 1 from the 38. I briefly considered a strategy of going for it on 4th and 2 or less from outside the 2, but I really think I'd punt in those situations. I also decided that piddly field goals were stupid and pointless. The bot suggests going for it pretty much once you get inside the 20, but I brought that down a bit and decided that once my team got to the 15 yard line and it was 4th and 3 or shorter, we were going for it. The next step was to determine when to punt vs. when to try for a long field goal when facing 4th and 10. Once again, using an average Field Goal range of 53 yards, so I'd be punting from the 38 and trying a long field goal at 37, again depending on my confidence in the kicker. From there it was relatively easy to plot the rest of the chart, using both the existing NFL chart and the Times recommended chart as a baseline. I based the punting numbers on the actual location on the field, while I built the field goal numbers around anticipated Field Goal length. The end result is something that's more conservative than what was originally presented in the article, but much more open than what's currently happening in today's NFL. Here's what my version looks like, in crappy Excel pic format: Someone give me Joe Philbin's number. I'm joking (a little - if you do have Philbin's number PM me), but I do believe that this sort of deep statistical analysis and application is one area the team is missing a bit. This is where smart teams are going to invest resources. Think of it as a Moneyball approach to football. Some of this is born out of watching the Phins over the last two years, and even before that. I'm so tired of watching this team punt when they're between the 45 yard lines. With our defense, we have no reason to consider punting when it's 4th and 1 from our own 45. I'll take my criticism a step further - I'm willing to bet that we will lose at least one game (and most likely have lost some games) because we aren't using this sort of cutting edge analytics methodology. So there you have it. I've fixed the awful 4th down decisions that our coaches have been making. You're welcome, Dolphins fans.
I would add Sean Peyton to your list of aggressive coaches. I do agree that coaching is generally a little too conservative for my tastes. I do not agree with how you and the times are looking at it because of other factors that must be taken into consideration. How well is your line playing and how effectively have you been moving the ball. How well is your defense playing What is the score How well is your punting playing My biggest beef with conservative coaching is when your down by a TD and they take the FG instead of going for it on 4th n 1 when the team has generally been moving the ball well for that drive. 1TD is greater than 2FGs so IMO taking the 3 points really does not do much especially when the LOS is inside the 20.
Really nice stuff - I am a big proponent of being aggressive. Obligatory Herm Edwards "YOU PLAY, TO WIN, THE GAME!" As an aside, I really hope Riverboat Ron stays aggressive. Such a great nickname. Would not mind seeing them make a run at all.
I think you would actually be surprised at just how analytical Joe Philbin is with certain things. When it comes to 4th down, last year Joe went for it on 17 fourth down situations. This year, he has gone for it 6 times. Miami's conversion rate isn't great, but they were aggressive with going for it on 4th down last year. I think their talent has made the coaches more conservative this year. Personally, I would go for it on 4th and short every time.
It's such a phony nickname. Ron Rivera has been one of the most conservative coaches in the NFL. He only started going for it on 4th down this year after a failure to go for it nearly cost him his job earlier this season.
I agree with being more aggressive on 4th and short, but every time? I'm certainly not going for it on 4th and 2 on my own 20 yard line.
I think there are many other factors to take into consideration, many already mentioned. Score, time left in game/half, how well your team is performing in those situations etc. Right now I cringe at the idea of 3rd or 4th and short.. It's all situational and IMO that is what a coach is for really. I'm pretty sure they already use plenty of plays based on the situation. You get a coach like Ron Rivera to start losing games bc of 4th down conversions that fail and we have a different conversation about his future.
I wouldn't blame Philbin for being too conservative, I would blame him for not having the team better prepared to gain a yard. If I had The Patriots ability to both get a yard and come back at the end of games I would go for it more often than the norm for sure. Our team is the exact opposite at both picking up a yard and coming back from big deficits so we should go for it less than the norm. Another thing to consider is confidence. Their defense gets a big confidence boost if they stop the try, their offense may even get an emotional boost. Going for it and getting stopped could change the momentum of the entire game. This is why its important to have a good gauge on your own teams ability to get the momentum back. Again, the Patriots I would trust, the Dolphins not so much. A third thing to consider is the average fan is stupid when it comes to this stuff. Look at the infamous decision Belichick made going for it against the Broncos, the fans were OUTRAGED, they still talk about it to this day. What they fail to realize is the outcome of the game rested on a virtual coin flip so it didn't really matter what Belichick did at that point. And a mathematician even proved after the fact that Belichick did indeed make the mathematically correct decision. It shouldn't really matter what stupid fans think but we all know it does to a certain extent, especially if you don't have Super Bowl wins under your belt.
I saw a spotlight on television a few years ago of a high school coach that hasn't carried a punter in over a decade, and he had the same philosophy on field goals as well. His logic was that once you decide to never kick the ball, you suddenly go from needing 3.33 yards per play to 2.50. While it doesn't sound like a whole lot, it completely opens up the playbook to aggressive plays that defenses can't adequately prepare for. On a 3rd and 2, for example, he would line up in a wishbone formation (or something similar, I can't remember) and run something like a play action bootleg...which would be a serious gamble if you're planning to punt on 4th down. Again, this is all from memory, but the team averaged something massive like an extra 5-7 first downs per game, an extra 12 points, and a dominant time of possession. I'll try to google it tomorrow to find the actual team but it was an inspiring read...the math seemed pretty clear. The only thing though was that the team had to commit to 4 down football every time though, because the play calling had to change so drastically between the two philosophies.
Didnt sego for it twice this week and fail both times? Aren't we the worst short yardage them in nfl history? I agree we should go for it more often but not until we get a power. Game going
Thanks for all the work, VO. It's interesting, especially when you consider it together with the story of the high school coach who doesn't punt at all. But it goes so against the grain of conventional wisdom that no coach who is interested in job security is going to take the risk in a close game. Look, for example, at the fade pass Sherman called on fourth and one at the goal line last week. He called that play because our people up front are congenitally unable to smashmouth for a yard, and he probably felt that the Jets wouldn't be expecting it. The failure to score didn't (couldn't) make any difference in the eventual outcome of the game, but the fan furor against Sherman for calling that play and not scoring is still being heard days later, even though going for it on 4th and 1 was the right decision. In a close game, you would have seen a field goal, because no coach wants to put himself out on an island and hear that a decision to go for it "lost the game for us." It's less a matter of playing the odds correctly and more a matter of playing it safe to keep one's job. If more coaches went into the job with the mindset that it's a temporary gig no matter what he does, so he might as well go for all the marbles while he's there, you might see more teams going for it.
For those of you interested here is the video on the HS team that never punts. They also always onside kick. Its interesting to hear the stats which back of the philosophy. http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/9970245/grantland-channel-coach-never-punts
Thanks VM. Loved that video. Love everything that coach stands for, man. Great personal story and philosophy, grounded in concrete analytics. Wonder if he'll move into the college ranks at a Div II or III school willing to take a chance on such a radical approach. Boosters would have to be onside. No pun intended. lol.
Why not? Is your opponent significantly more likely to score from your 37 yard line than he is to score from your 38? I really don't think he is; I think you're arbitrarily creating a comfort zone. However, the whole point of the "going for it on 4th down" exercise, in my mind, is to remove arbitrary concepts such as "field goal range" from the equation. What does "field goal range" signify, anyway? It certainly doesn't signify that an NFL kicker is likely to make the field goal. It only signifies that NFL headcoaches are comfortable with having him try. That, however, doesn't strike me as a statistically relevent proposition, especially if we're arguing that NFL coaches are, by and large, too conservative. In order to establish a sensible "point of no return", you'd have to know exactly how likely opponents are to score on you from any given point of the field. The whole "don't punt in no man's land" argument is very popular, but I'm not sure it would hold up to any statistical evaluation. Unlike a punt from your own, say, 10 yard line, a punt from the 45 virtually guarantees that your opponent will have a long field, thus significantly reducing the probability that he will score on you and/or put you in bad field position. Also, what do you gain by going for it on, say, 4th and 6 from your own 47? How likely are you to convert? How likely are you to mount a scoring drive after converting? And how do those numbers stack up with your opponent's likelihood to score from your 47?
They don't really apply to the pro game, however. No NFL team is going to surrender a TD from the 40 yard line 77% of the time. Not even close.
